down that such an absence of a reasonable expectation gives rise to a presumption of fact that the vendee intended not to pay: *Talcott* v. *Henderson,* 31 Ohio St. 162; *Jaffrey* v. *Brown* (C. C.), 29 Fed. 476. With due deference to what seems the weight of authority, one must acknowledge the force of reasoning contained in the cases decided adversely. If a vendee have no reasonable expectation of being able to pay, and if, as all men are, he is presumed to intend the natural results of his acts, then there seems much of reason in the holding that as regards the rights of creditors, except where the rights of innocent third persons have intervened, the vendee shall be deemed to have intended not to pay.

SCHOOLS—VALIDITY OF REGULATIONS AS TO SECRET SOCIETIES.—The Board of Directors of a school district, with authority by law to regulate and control the public schools of that district, passed a resolution to the effect that any pupil of the high school who was or should become a member of a Greek letter fraternity would not be allowed any of the privileges of the school except that of attending classes. On petition to enjoin the enforcement of the rule, *Held,* the petition should be dismissed. *Wayland* v. *Board of School Directors, etc.,* (1906), — Wash. —, 86 Pac. Rep. 642.

All ordinances and resolutions of the municipal legislative body must be reasonable. DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 4th Ed., par. 319; *Trustees of Schools* v. *People,* 87 Ill. 303, 29 Am. Rep. 55. Resolutions of school boards are analagous to municipal ordinances. *State ex rel Stallard* v. *White,* 82 Ind. 278, 42 Am. Rep. 496. And when power to legislate upon a particular subject is expressly conferred and resolutions are passed pursuant thereto, they are the sole and final judges as to their reasonableness and expediency, and they will not be reviewed by the courts unless arbitrary or malicious. ABBOTT, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, p. 1347; *ex parte Delaney,* 43 Calif. 478; *Board of Education* v. *Booth,* 110 Ky. 807, 62 S. W. 872; *Watson* v. *City of Cambridge,* 157 Mass. 561, 32 N. E. 864. It would seem, therefore, that any rule or regulation that would tend to increase the efficiency of the school, whether it operated directly upon the management of the school itself or upon the recipients of its benefits, would be sustained by the courts. The evidence in the principal case clearly showed that the tendency of the Greek letter fraternities was to create a "Clannish spirit of insubordination," affecting materially not only the progress of the students belonging to the fraternities, but also the whole school. That the school officials had control of the acts of the pupils in so far as they affect the successful conduct of the school is well settled. *Burdick* v. *Babcock,* 31 Iowa 562. The court in delivering the opinion strongly emphasized the fact that they were not deciding whether the board could forbid all the privileges of the school, including that of attending classes. But it would seem that the decision, even with the facts thus, should be the same. If it was within the power of the board to prohibit students from becoming members of fraternities, they must also have authority to enforce such rule, and ultimately the only way the rule could be enforced, other less severe measures failing, would be by expulsion.